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Abstract: 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the motives of the Swedish political parties for 
pursuing supranational asylum policies in the European Union. Although Sweden generally 
disapproves of supranationality Sweden is one of the foremost advocators of the Common 
European Asylum System. This thesis seeks to investigate the motives of the Swedish 
political parties for pursuing this agenda by testing the applicability of three theories on 
migration policy harmonization in Europe; burden-sharing, venue-shopping and international 
solidarity, which have rarely been empirically applied. As the empirical knowledge of the 
political parties’ preferences towards the common asylum system is limited the preferences 
will be mapped out. The empirical analysis has been conducted using motive analysis and 
covers three policy cases from 1998-2009; the Schengen Convention, “The directive on 
mutual recognition of expulsion decisions” and the Stockholm Programme. The empirical 
analysis shows that the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party agree that asylum 
policy should be supranational and restrictive. The smaller parties prefer generous asylum 
policies but are divided on the supranational line were the Left Party and Green Party prefer 
intergovernmentalism. The motives of the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party 
can be explained by burden-sharing and venue-shopping. International solidarity is a motive 
for all the small parties while burden-sharing also plays a role for some of the centre-right 
parties. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The member states of the European Union (EU) are currently in the process of harmonizing 
their asylum policies.
1 
By creating the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) the EU 
wants refugees coming to Europe to meet a uniform asylum system and to level out the 
refugee reception among the member states (Hansen, 2008: 136-37). The question is; why do 
the member states want to harmonize asylum policy which is an area intimately associated 
with national sovereignty? There are many theories that seek to answer this question taking 
various different perspectives into consideration, such as burden-sharing, venue-shopping and 
international solidarity (Thielemann, 2008; Guiraudon, 2000; Givens & Luedkte, 2004; 
Zolberg, 1999). Although these theories bring several interesting aspects to the table their 
actual influence is hard to account for as they have seldom been empirically applied to the 
political interplay in the member states. Another problem is that they often overlook the role 
that mainstream political parties play (Bale, 2008; Schain, 2006). As the political parties have 
the formal power to influence asylum policy their role will be investigated in this study.
 
 
One of the strongest supporters of the CEAS is Sweden, which is quite mysterious 
considering the fact that Sweden is quite hesitant about supranationality in most other policy 
areas (Andersson, 2008; Vink, 2002; Abiri, 2000). Swedish asylum policy has traditionally 
been associated with solidarity and generosity, and considering the connection made between 
the EU’s migration policy and the construction of ‘Fortress Europe’ the supportive Swedish 
position seems even more odd (Hansen, 2008; Givens, 2003). How can this be explained? 
 
Turning to previous research on asylum policy-making in Sweden much focus has been put 
upon the national asylum policy debate rather than the discussions on the European asylum 
policy-making. In the national debate the focal point has been whether or not the Swedish 
asylum policy should be restrictive or generous, and to what extent supranational solutions are 
required (Andersson, 2008; Abiri, 2000; Spång, 2006). Although the national policy debate 
may provide us with indications to the supportive Swedish position, it cannot explain the 
                                                 
1
 In this paper the terms migration policy, immigration policy and asylum policy are used. Migration is a 
multidimensional area that spans from refugee seeking to labor migration. Migration policy is a general term that 
refers to all aspects of migration, such as asylum seeking, family reunion and labor migration. Immigration 
policy is a somewhat narrower term that covers those types of migration that does not spring from flight. Finally, 
asylum policy is the politics that regulates asylum seekers. The terms ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’ are used in 
parallel. 
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official standpoint in full, due to the lack of empirical evidence from the European 
harmonization process. In order to confirm whether or not these dimensions are applicable for 
Sweden in the European asylum debate, they will be investigated in this study. 
 
Another interesting point in Swedish asylum policy is the rather unconventional formation of 
the political parties. Mikael Spång (2006: 35) has identified two blocks in Swedish asylum 
policy-making. The restrictive block is made up by the Social Democratic Party and the 
Moderate Party, who are occasionally joined by the Centre Party. The liberal block consists of 
the Green Party, the Left Party, the Liberal People’s Party, and the Christian Democrats. 
However, too little empirical research has been conducted in relation to the common asylum 
system in order to confirm or reject this picture of the political parties. 
 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly the aim is to map out the preferences of the political 
parties in terms of (1) supranational or intergovernmental, and (2) generous or restrictive 
preferences in order to increase our knowledge of how the parties position themselves in 
European asylum policy-making. Do patterns emerge over time and can parallels be drawn to 
the national asylum policy debate? Furthermore, the aim is to explain the motives of the 
political parties using theories on burden-sharing, venue-shopping and international solidarity 
to see which, if any, of these perspectives impacts the parties. 
 
1.2 Disposition 
The disposition of this paper is as follow. In the second chapter the theoretical framework of 
the study is presented including previous research, theory and the research aim and questions. 
The third chapter addresses the methodological considerations of the research design, case 
selection and material. The fourth chapter contains the analytical framework which is the 
basis of the empirical analysis. In the fifth and sixth chapters the empirical results are 
presented. The fifth chapter maps out the preferences of the political parties related to each 
policy case while the sixth chapter seeks to explain the parties’ motives. Finally, in the 
seventh chapter conclusions are drawn. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Previous research 
2.1.1 Asylum policy-making in Sweden 
As mentioned in the introduction Sweden is a strong supporter of the Common European 
Asylum System, which undoubtedly evokes some questions. On the one hand Sweden has 
been considered a generous country when it comes to granting asylum (Andersson, 2008; 
Vink, 2002; Abiri, 2000) on the other hand the creation of the CEAS is often connected with 
‘Fortress Europe’ and more restrictive asylum policies (Hansen, 2008: Givens, 2003). The 
question is why does Sweden hold this position and how has the official standpoint been 
formulated? 
 
Sweden has been a net immigrant country since the end of World War II, but for a long time 
refugees were only a small part of the total amount of immigrants arriving in Sweden. For this 
reason almost all refugees were granted asylum and Sweden built up an international image 
based on generosity and solidarity with the third world countries. In the 1980s the number of 
asylum seekers started to grow alongside an increasing political frustration. In 1985 there was 
a break in the traditional asylum policy-making and more restrictive policies were introduced 
(Abiri, 2000: 12-13). This new style of policy-making has remained unchanged since 1985 
even though Sweden has been governed by two ideologically opposing parties, the Social 
Democratic Party and the Moderate Party. Several of the policies introduced since the 1980s, 
such as the principle of first asylum country, are similar to the policies that would later be 
implemented within the frame of the EU (Abiri, 2000: 14). It is also during this period that the 
Swedish position towards asylum cooperation in Europe is formed. As the number of asylum 
seekers peaked at the beginning of the 1990s with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Sweden 
started to argue for the need of a Europeanized asylum policy, not at least in terms of burden-
sharing (Abiri, 2000; Geddes, 2003).  
 
Although the Swedish position towards a common asylum system was established already in 
the 1990s it has continued to develop since then. Hans Andersson (2008) has studied 
Sweden’s position towards the CEAS in terms of decision-making procedures until 2007. 
During this time period he observed two major shifts in the Swedish standpoint. The first shift 
relates to the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) which Sweden initially opposed. This 
6 
 
opinion shifted when the Nice Treaty was being negotiated. Andersson identified the slow 
progress made in the policy-making process as the reason for this. By introducing QMV all 
member states would have to make an effort in asylum policy-making which would drive 
harmonization forward (Andersson, 2008: 156). The second shift concerns the use of 
minimum conditions in the common asylum system. Initially Sweden had been positive 
towards minimum conditions as they were seen as a guarantee of the Swedish liberal system. 
But when the Lisbon Treaty was being negotiated several of the Swedish parties abandoned 
the demand for minimum conditions, which is more puzzling. Andersson (2008: 161) believes 
that burden-sharing had a role to play; although he points out that there is too little empirical 
research in this field in order to draw any general conclusions.  
 
Researchers who have studied the positions of the political parties in relation to the common 
asylum system often categorize them on two theoretical dimensions: (1) supranational or 
intergovernmental, and (2) restrictive or generous. Despite their ideological differences 
Sweden’s two biggest political parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party, 
both support a supranational and restrictive line in asylum policy (Andersson, 2008; Odmalm, 
2011; Spång, 2006; Abiri, 2000: Kjellgren, 2010). While the smaller parties are divided along 
these theoretical dimensions they all tend to criticize the government for not defending the 
Swedish generous system enough at the EU-level (Spång, 2006: 31). The consensus on 
immigration and asylum policy between the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party 
has also been observed by Abiri (2000). Although these parties represent the opposing block 
Swedish politics, they have been in agreement on asylum policy since the 1990s. Abiri also 
pointed out that asylum policy divisions often are found within the big parties, especially 
when it comes to the level of restrictiveness. These divisions are the result of a greater 
ideological argumentation rather than pure party ideology (Abiri, 2000: 24-25).  
 
According to Spång (2006: 35) two asylum policy blocks have emerged in Swedish politics 
that are inconsistent with political ideology and the parties’ general position towards the EU. 
The restrictive block consists of the Social Democrats, the Moderate Party and occasionally 
the Centre Party. The liberal block consists of the Left Party, the Green Party, the Liberal 
People’s Party and usually also the Christian Democrats. Although many researchers 
generally agree on the blocks presented by Spång they do not always agree that these 
preferences have been stable. Andersson (2008: 17) points out that the Liberal People’s Party, 
who initially supported supranational asylum policies, started to have doubts in the beginning 
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of the 21
st
 century. However, too little empirical research has focused on party preferences 
towards the CEAS over time in order to draw any general conclusions on the stability of party 
preferences, which is something I will address in this thesis. 
 
Spång (2006: 37) points out that the two blocks that have emerged are a result of the Swedish 
political debate during the 1980s and -90s, and that the political tensions between the large 
and small parties have been transferred into the harmonization debate. He also notes that the 
Swedish political debate has been affected very little by the actual asylum policy 
harmonization; rather it has been shaped by European integration as a whole. Inge Dahlstedt 
(2000) has studied the Swedish parliamentary asylum debates during the 1980s and -90s. He 
observes a shift in rhetoric during the 1990s where less emphasis was put on solidarity and 
generosity. When Sweden joined the EU in 1995 the Swedish asylum policy entered the 
international spotlight. Rather than expressing pride in the generous national asylum system 
the Swedish political debate was characterized by fear of being different from the other 
member states (Dahlstedt, 2000: 50-51). 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I raised the question of how the Swedish standpoint on the 
common asylum system has been formulated. After reviewing the research within this field it 
is hard to find a satisfactory answer. From a historical perspective we can see how the rise of 
asylum seekers has put pressure on the Swedish asylum system, leading to some noticeable 
policy changes as well as the desire for a supranational asylum system. Several researchers 
have also established the rather odd agreement that exists between the Social Democrats and 
the Moderate Party as well as the deviating opinions among the smaller parties. But can we 
really say that we understand the political interplay that surrounds the formulation of the 
Swedish standpoint? On the basis of the inadequate knowledge within this field I argue that it 
is necessary to continue to explore the political parties and their interactions in order to 
achieve a proper understanding of the state of play. By understanding the preferences and 
motives of the political parties it is possible to acquire a small piece of the puzzle as to what 
drives harmonization of asylum policy forward. 
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2.1.2 Harmonizing European asylum policies 
In order to explain the behavior of the Swedish political parties when it comes to asylum 
policy harmonization it is essential to utilize the large quantity of research on migration policy 
harmonization in Europe. As many researchers seek to answer the question of why the 
member states have chosen to delegate political power to the supranational institutions in the 
EU, previous research is to a large extent theory driven.
2
 Consequently there are several 
overarching theories as to why the member states have chosen to harmonize migration policy 
areas (Boswell, 2007, 2009; Guild, 2003: Givens & Luedkte, 2004; Guiraudon, 2000, 2003; 
Huysmans, 2000; Thielemann, 2008) that could be used to explain the motives of the Swedish 
political parties. 
 
Three commonly applied theories in research on migration policy harmonization in Europe 
are (1) venue-shopping, (2) securitization and (3) burden-sharing. These theoretical 
perspectives offer different explanations as to why the member states would want to 
harmonize migration policy. While securitization highlights that the motor of harmonization 
is the description of asylum seekers as security threats (Huysmans, 2000; Guild, 2003) venue-
shopping points to the fact that policy pressure and political opposition motivate the dominant 
actors to harmonize (Guiraudon, 2000, 2003; Givens & Luedkte, 2004). Burden-sharing on 
the other hand explains asylum policy harmonization in the light of leveling out the reception 
of refugees between the member states in the EU (Thielemann, 2008). The problem with these 
overarching theories, as will be seen in the next chapter, is the fact that they seldom have been 
applied to the empirical context in any of the member states. One example of this is 
Thielemann (2008) who in his article on burden-sharing in the creation of the CEAS makes 
not a single reference to national policy processes. Since the theories have not been applied to 
national policy processes, thereby overlooking to analyze the political interplay between the 
different national actors, it is hard to judge the validity of the theories. The fact that the 
overarching theories have not been tested empirically is a significant problem with previous 
                                                 
2
 Migration policy harmonization is a piece of the puzzle to European integration as a whole. Neofunctionalism 
(Schmitter, 2005) and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) are two commonly applied theories that seek to 
explain the overall European integration and to what extent the member states drive integration forward. 
Although they serve as the backdrop for several of the theories within this field (Guild, 2003: Givens & Luedkte, 
2004; Guiraudon, 2000, 2003; Huysmans, 2000) they do not take the particular concerns of migration policy into 
account. Furthermore, as this study focus on the preferences and motives of the political parties rather than the 
influence of the Swedish government versus the European Commission, they are not included in this study. 
Nevertheless, it is good to reflect upon the ideas presented by e.g. Tallberg (2002) that the member states to a 
large extent will hold on to areas of political importance such as asylum policy, and what their motives for 
harmonizing these policy areas might be? 
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research. In this thesis I seek to apply theories on venue-shopping, burden-sharing and 
international solidarity on the Swedish political parties in order to see whether they can be 
used to explain the motives of the parties in the European asylum policy-making process. This 
will not only contribute to our understanding of the Swedish political parties, but also provide 
a small step in investigating whether or not these theories are applicable to actual asylum 
policy-making. 
 
Another problem with the research in this field is the fact that many researchers overlook the 
important role that political parties play in the development of the common asylum policy. 
When discussing migration the role of organized interest groups, such as trade unions, are 
emphasized while political parties, who actually have real influence over the policy process, 
are disregarded. This behavior has been observed by for instance Bale (2008). He concludes 
that when political parties are discussed in migration research they tend to be so from a very 
limited perspective, e.g. the far-right extremist parties. This is unfortunate since political 
parties are at the centre of migration policy-making, even if migration policy would be 
completely harmonized in the EU (Bale, 2008: 316).  
 
When studying political parties on migration topics it is easy to focus on the parties with anti-
immigration agendas. Extremist parties certainly influence the public debate, which may 
require the mainstream parties to adjust their politics (Perlmutter, 1996; Schain, 2006). But 
they rarely acquire more than an indirect influence over migration policy-making, which 
means that their impact on policy is limited (Schain, 2006: 287). The role of the mainstream 
centre-right parties is, on the other hand, often overlooked. Many European countries are 
governed by centre-right parties who are equally preoccupied with asylum policy as the 
extremist parties (Bale, 2008: 318). Likewise, Hinnfors, Spehar and Bucken-Knapp (2011) 
have argued that social democratic parties are overlooked in migration policy research. In 
order to better understand the role that political parties play in asylum policy-making, the 
mainstream parties need to be put into the spotlight. 
 
Studying previous research on European migration policy-making, it is clear that several 
important pieces of the puzzle that could help us to understand the motives of the Swedish 
political parties are present. Unfortunately, even if the theoretical perspectives cover many 
interesting aspects their actual impact is hard to judge since they have not been tested 
empirically on national policy processes. Moreover, they often present a very shallow 
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interpretation of the harmonization process as a whole. The complexity of migration policy is 
a well known fact as it ties into several other policy areas regardless of whether the asylum 
debate is held at the national or supranational level. Yet the theoretical models presented are 
often very simplistic, usually emphasizing only one theoretical aspect, such as burden-
sharing. In order to understand why the member states have chosen to harmonize asylum 
policy it is important to proceed from the national level and take several theoretical 
perspectives into account. By focusing on the national policy processes, it is possible to get a 
better understanding of the overarching theories on migration policy harmonization. Here the 
mainstream political parties have an important role to play as they provide the vital link to 
why the member states want to proceed with asylum policy-making at the supranational level. 
 
2.2 Theory 
In order to explain why the political parties want a supranational asylum policy, I will use 
overarching theories on migration policy harmonization in Europe. As mentioned previously 
there are many theories that seek to explain why the EU member states have chosen to 
harmonize migration policy areas. In this thesis I will use venue-shopping, burden-sharing 
and international solidarity to explain the motives of the political parties, which will be 
explained more fully in the next section. The reason for applying these theories in particular is 
that they pick up important points from the national asylum policy debate. As Sweden is one 
of the countries in the EU who receives the largest proportion of asylum seekers it is likely 
that burden-sharing has a role to play. If the theory is well founded then Sweden should be 
one of the countries were political parties are motivated by burden-sharing. Likewise, if 
support of burden-sharing cannot be found among the Swedish political parties then we may 
question the accuracy of this theoretical perspective in the development of the CEAS. The fact 
that burden-sharing seems to be one of the key driving forces behind the Swedish standpoint 
to the common asylum policy has previously been pointed out by Andersson (2008) who also 
has concluded that empirical research has been to scarce to confirm this picture. Applying 
burden-sharing in this empirical analysis is a small step toward confirmation or rejection of 
his conclusions.  
 
The use of venue-shopping is also based on elements in the Swedish asylum policy debate. 
Previous research has shown quite substantial political divisions among the parties when it 
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comes to the national asylum policy-making and that the debate has heated up in recent years 
(Andersson, 2008; Odmalm, 2011; Spång, 2006; Abiri, 2000). Since differences of opinions 
exist in the national asylum policy debate, for instance on the generosity of asylum policy, it 
is probable that the dominating actors, in the case the Social Democratic Party and the 
Moderate Party, escape to the EU-level in order to anchor their positions and avoid pressure 
from their political opponents. Spång (2006) has noticed that the smaller parties tend to 
criticize the government for not defending the generosity of Swedish asylum policy in EU 
negotiations. Furthermore Spehar (2012) highlights that both the Social Democratic Party and 
the Moderate Party have had problems in the past to implement restrictive asylum policies 
within the national policy-making process, another indication that these parties have the 
incentives to venue-shop. For these reasons Sweden is a good case to test how well venue-
shopping can be empirically applied. 
 
Securitization is one theoretical perspective that will not be used in this study.
3
 The reason for 
excluding securitization is based on criticism put forward in previous research as well as the 
Swedish domestic asylum policy debate. As suggested by for instance Boswell (2007, 2009) 
there is little evidence that securitization has a lasting effect on asylum policy-making, even if 
policy makers temporarily respond to public opinion on security issues. Furthermore, as the 
research presented by Dahlstedt (2000) has shown, securitized agendas and the description of 
immigrants as security threats has had very little impact on the Swedish political debate. The 
asylum policy debate has rather focused on issues such as international solidarity, which is the 
third theoretical perspective applied in this thesis. As there is little evidence from previous 
research that securitization motivates the Swedish political parties to pursue a supranational 
asylum policy it will be excluded from the analysis. 
 
                                                 
3
 Securitization seeks to explain migration policy harmonization by presenting immigrants as security threats in 
the public debate and in the decision-making process, which means that asylum policy-making moves away from 
the traditional focus on human rights. Linking asylum seekers with terrorism is especially common after the 
terrorist attack in New York 9/11 2001 (Huysmans, 2000; Guild, 2003). Securitization has been criticized for 
exaggerating the impact of securitized agendas in migration policy. Boswell (2007: 606) has studied the impact 
of 9/11 on European migration policy-making and found little impact on the migration discourse. She also points 
out that those member states who do peruse a securitized migration agenda will only do so for a limited time 
period, and that aggravated public opinions will not result in a permanent security strategy (Boswell, 2009: 103). 
Nevertheless, the fact that securitization is excluded from this analysis does not mean that it should be 
disregarded as a valid theoretical perspective. The fact that it does not seem to fit the Swedish case does not 
automatically mean that it is not valid in other member states. 
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2.2.1 Venue-shopping 
Venue-shopping is one of the theories used in this thesis to explain the motives of the political 
parties in seeking out supranational asylum policies. One of the first researchers to apply 
venue-shopping to the development of EU migration policy was Virginie Guiraudon (2000, 
2003). Venue-shopping focuses on the national level and emphasizes the role of domestic 
political pressure. The dominant political actors may face resistance in carrying out their 
political agenda due to institutional constraints or political opposition. By transferring asylum 
policy to a new political venue, i.e. the EU, the national political or institutional opposition 
may be bypassed. Venue-shopping is thereby a way for political actors to regain control. 
Using the EU the dominant party may cement their asylum policy preferences as it is very 
hard to undo EU legislation. Parties who ‘venue-shop’ may also use EU as a scapegoat for the 
new asylum policy. It is not only political actors that can gain from venue-shopping but also 
public officials who often face less institutional constraints at the supranational level. The 
consequence of venue-shopping is that EU migration policy only reflects the preferences of 
the dominant actors in each member state (Guiraudon, 2000: 257-58). 
 
Venue-shopping is not only useful to explain why the member states have chosen to 
harmonize migration policy but also to explain the high degree of fragmentation in EU 
migration policy. While areas such as the Schengen Convention are very progressive other 
areas, for instance labor migration, have barely been harmonized at all (Hansen, 2008). 
Guiraudon (2003) points out that these parallel tracks should be understood as an effect of the 
‘windows of opportunities’ that has materialized along the way. If a national actor has decided 
to venue-shop at the EU-level they need to adapt their strategies to the relevant and available 
opportunities, taking into account the power struggles between different actors. Hence 
migration policy development should not be seen as an effect of path dependency or rational 
bargaining (Guiraudon, 2003: 264-67). 
 
Furthermore, Givens and Luedkte (2004: 150-51) emphasize that success of migration policy 
harmonization is a direct effect of the national politics where political salience, political 
partisanship and the level of institutional protection of migrant rights play key roles. In recent 
years the political salience of migration topics has risen due to the increased interest from the 
public and the political parties. When taking decisions on, e.g. asylum policy harmonization 
the national governments will be affected by the level of political salience and the level of 
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institutional protection of asylum seekers. When political salience and the level of 
institutional protection are high the national government has the incentives to support 
harmonization, which means that harmonization of asylum policy primarily leads to 
restrictive supranational policies. Givens and Luedkte (2004: 151) define institutional 
protection as high when courts, civil society and EU institutions are actively involved in 
protecting asylum seekers. As the Swedish civil society is actively involved in asylum policy 
and the legal security in asylum procedures is monitored by a migration court (Fryklund & 
Lundberg, 2009: 14-17), the institutional protection of asylum seekers in Sweden should be 
considered high. 
 
The idea that the member states use the EU as a ‘venue of secrecy’ is challenged by Boswell 
and Geddes (2011: 155). They point out that international asylum cooperation often sends the 
signal home that the government is working towards tougher asylum rules. It is only towards 
the citizens that the EU is used as a scapegoat. Furthermore Boswell and Geddes (2011: 154-
55) discard the notion of the restrictive EU policy as suggested by both Guiraudon and Givens 
and Luedkte. The EU’s asylum policies have raised the standards in several countries and 
served as a starting point for liberalization in some countries. Another problem with venue-
shopping is that it lacks empirical foundation at the national level. Guiraudon (2000, 2003) 
uses policy processes and negotiations at the EU level to exemplify venue-shopping despite 
the fact that it is so intimately associated with the relationship between the national actors.  
 
2.2.2 Burden-sharing 
Burden-sharing is another important theoretical aspect that focuses on the principle that the 
member states should share the ‘asylum burden’. As Andersson (2008: 161) has noted 
burden-sharing seems to be part of the Swedish strategy towards the common asylum policy 
and is present in the Swedish official standpoint towards the CEAS. The question is whether 
burden-sharing is a goal in itself or if it is only part of the strategy to reach another agenda? 
 
Burden-sharing is essentially a way to achieve greater solidarity between countries regarding 
refugee reception. As some countries are more reluctant than others to grant asylum some 
countries receive a disproportionately large amount of refugees. When a country introduces 
restrictive asylum policies it might be provocative for countries with a generous asylum 
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system as it is seen as an increase of their ‘asylum burden’. Eiko Thielemann is one scholar 
who has emphasized the role of burden-sharing in the development of a common asylum 
system in the EU. According to him there are close links between the need for burden-sharing 
and the development of the CEAS. By creating a common asylum system binding rules are 
introduced in all the member states which should reduce the risk that some try to escape their 
responsibilities (Thielemann, 2008: 2).  
 
Thielemann (2008) also notes that burden-sharing does not automatically mean that all states 
receive an equal number of asylum seekers. He separates two regimes of burden-sharing that 
incorporates different perspectives on solidarity. One-dimensional burden-sharing aims at 
equalizing the proportion of asylum seekers that the countries needs to receive. This is either 
done by binding regulations such as refugee quotas or through voluntary pledging 
mechanisms, such as the establishment of appealing systems between participating countries 
(Thielemann, 2008: 3-4). Multi-dimensional burden-sharing has a wider interpretation of 
solidarity. It does not seek to equalize the ‘asylum burden’ on a single dimension as the 
previous regime, but takes many perspectives into account. Countries that receive more 
asylum seekers than others can be compensated in other areas. One example is the creation of 
explicit compensation where it is possible to sell refugee quotas to other countries. Another 
strategy is to employ a trading logic where some countries receive refugees while others, e.g. 
send troops to instable counties to keep the peace and prevent migration (Thielemann, 2008: 
4). ‘Sharing people’ is not something that is unfamiliar to the EU who has tried to implement 
burden-sharing mechanisms in the common asylum policy. One example is the Dublin 
Convention or the European Refugee Fund. These initiatives have often been criticized both 
from a human rights perspective but also from the effectiveness of the burden-sharing point of 
view (Thielemann, 2008: 5). 
 
As pointed out in the previous chapter burden-sharing as a motive for asylum policy 
harmonization has very seldom been applied to the national empirical context. Regional 
burden-sharing within the member states has been studied empirically by, e.g. Boswell 
(2003), but there are few empirical studies where burden-sharing is presented in relation to the 
CEAS.  
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2.2.3 International solidarity and human rights 
The final theoretical perspective used in this study is international solidarity and protection of 
human rights, an influencing factor in asylum policy decisions that have characterized the 
Swedish asylum policy debate (Dahlstedt, 2000). There are many different factors that 
influence asylum policy decisions, and according to Zolberg (1999: 81-86) migration affects 
society on two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the economical effects migration 
will have on the receiving countries. While employers tend to support generous migration 
policies since they increase access to labor and lowers wage costs, trade unions tend to oppose 
generous migration policies since they may lower wage levels and working conditions. The 
second dimension concerns identity and the cultural effects migration may have on the 
receiving country. Extremist anti-immigration parties’ perceive migration as a threat to the 
national culture and traditions and thereby advocate restrictions. But identity may also create 
support of generous migration policies with actors that seek to support multiculturalism and 
show solidarity with people in distress. Zolberg’s dimensions may not only help us to 
understand ‘unholy’ coalitions such as identified by Spång (2006) but also why political 
parties favor restrictive or generous asylum policies. The desire to, e.g. protect human rights 
may explain why parties that do not usually cooperate find common grounds. 
 
As highlighted by, e.g. Dahlstedt (2000) international solidarity has been of major concern for 
some of the Swedish parties in the asylum policy debate. Solidarity as a concept has shaped 
several of the Swedish parties ideologically. Parties rooted in the socialist movement such as 
the Left Party have strong bonds to working class solidarity. Likewise, ‘global solidarity’ may 
influence newer parties such as the Green Party. The ideological relationship to solidarity may 
impact the parties’ interests in the asylum policy debate (Poguntke, 2006). Concerning the 
EU’s asylum policy the importance of international solidarity falls back on the discussions 
around Fortress Europe. Some groups believe that the EU through arrangements such as the 
Schengen Convention is shutting its borders towards third world countries and poor migrants 
(Hansen, 2008; Givens, 2003). Among these we find political parties who are very provoked 
by the attempts to build the CEAS.  
 
 
 
16 
 
2.3 Research aim and questions 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the motives of the Swedish political parties to pursue 
supranational asylum policies in the EU. There are currently a number of theories on 
migration policy harmonization that seeks to explain this but, as few of them have been 
empirically applied their impact on the political process is hard to account for. More precisely 
this thesis will investigate the possible influence of three of these theories; burden-sharing, 
venue-shopping and international solidarity. A prerequisite for this is to map out the 
preferences of the mainstream political parties towards the CEAS. As previous research has 
focused on the national policy debate, there is currently limited empirical knowledge on how 
the parties position themselves towards the CEAS and if these preferences are stable over 
time. With this thesis I intend to contribute to this knowledge by studying party preferences 
between 1998-2009 on two dimensions; (1) supranational or intergovernmental, and (2) 
restrictive or generous. By connecting the preferences and motives of the political parties 
towards the CEAS we may acquire new knowledge about the Swedish asylum policy debate 
as well as how it interplays with harmonization of European asylum policy at large.   
 
- Have the political parties preferred supranational or intergovernmental policies in the 
creation of the Common European Asylum System? 
 
- Have the political parties preferred restrictive or generous policies in the creation of 
the Common European Asylum System? 
 
- Do patterns in party preferences emerge between 1998 and 2009? 
 
- Can the motives of the parties towards the creation of the Common European Asylum 
System be understood in terms of burden-sharing, venue-shopping and/or 
international solidarity? 
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3. METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Research design 
This thesis is a qualitative study that investigates the formation of the Swedish standpoint 
towards the CEAS by focusing on the preferences and motives of the political parties. As the 
preferences and motives are the focal point the qualitative design is the most advantageous. It 
makes it possible to understand how the Swedish standpoint has been shaped by the political 
parties without limiting the possibility to capture party preferences and motives. Within the 
qualitative field there is a range of methodological approaches that could have been used. As 
will be explained in the next chapter, motive analysis is the most appropriate one for the 
design of this study. 
 
Since the theories used in this thesis have rarely been empirically applied it would have been 
relevant to conduct this type of study on all the member states. As each country has its own 
political system, relationship to the EU and asylum policy preferences, they can all contribute 
to increase our understanding of the harmonization process. However, Sweden is a 
particularly interesting case since it has a very distinctive asylum system, with an 
intergovernmental approach to the European cooperation in general and is still one of the 
foremost promoters of a supranational asylum system within the EU. Although much is 
known about the national asylum policy debate, our understanding of the European asylum 
policy debate in Sweden is limited, another reason for choosing Sweden. As described in the 
theoretical chapter, Sweden is also an interesting case to apply burden-sharing, venue-
shopping and international solidarity in order to increase our empirical knowledge of these 
theories. Besides the societal and theoretical angle there are also methodological and practical 
reasons to use Sweden as an object of study. As the empirical analysis has been made by text 
analysis, being a native speaker of Swedish is an invaluable asset as the understanding of the 
language is essential for the researcher performing the analysis. 
 
The actors investigated in this thesis are the Swedish mainstream political parties. Even if 
there are a range of other actors that also seek to affect asylum policy, it is the political parties 
that have the direct influence over the politics. As previously highlighted (Bale, 2008) the 
importance of the mainstream political parties is often overlooked, which means that an 
important part of migration policy-making has been obscured. Since the analysis stretches 
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from 1998-2009 only parties that have been in parliament throughout this period are included 
in the analysis. 
 
The following parties are included in the study; the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), the Social 
Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti), the Green Party (Miljöpartiet 
de Gröna), the Centre Party (Centerpartiet), the Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet 
Liberalerna), the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and the Moderate Party 
(Moderata samlingspartiet).
4
 
 
3.2 Method 
The empirical results in this study have been produced by the use of motive analysis. As this 
thesis aims to uncover the motives as well as the preferences of the political parties towards 
the common asylum policy, this is the most appropriate method.  
 
Motive analysis is a method that makes it possible to capture the premeditated motives
5
 of the 
object of study, in this case the Swedish political parties. Using motive analysis it is possible 
to link the descriptive findings of the political parties’ preferences to their motives for 
supporting/ not supporting the harmonization process. The form of motive analysis used in 
this study is intentional motive analysis as the study aims to capture the intended motives of 
the parties, not how they have calculated their decisions. A motive analysis can be performed 
using both text analysis and interviews. In this thesis I have performed a text analysis on 
official documents from the Swedish parliament and government, which made it possible to 
capture how the parties act in the formal policy-making process. When it comes to uncovering 
the motives behind political decisions official documentation is a good and reliable source 
(Esaiasson et al, 2009: 335), as will be explained in the material chapter. 
 
The reason for using motive analysis rather than another branch of text analysis is that it 
makes it possible to connect the parties’ preferences with their possible motives. A discourse 
analysis would have been appropriate if the aim had been to put the preferences in a societal 
                                                 
4
 Due to the fact that the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) is not a mainstream party and have only 
been in parliament since 2010 the party is excluded from this study.  
5
 It is important to distinguish between motives and motivations. A motive explains the underlying factors behind 
a certain preference. It is a mental process that cannot be directly observed. The motivations actors use to justify 
their political decisions can be directly observed, but may not necessarily be a true reflection of the motives.  
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context. To detect winners and losers in the debate an argumentation analysis would have 
been preferable. Another reason behind the choice of motive analysis is the fact that it does 
not take into account if the parties’ arguments are objective or well founded, only if they 
believe them to be correct (Esaiasson et al, 2009: 328). As with all strands of text analysis the 
interpretation of the text is central regardless of the format. The focus of the text analysis will 
be on the sender of the text, i.e. the political party in question, as the aim is to uncover party 
preferences and motives (Bergström & Boréus, 2005). 
 
Preconceptions are important to address when performing a text analysis, as this makes it 
possible for the reader to critically judge the validity of the empirical results. Each researcher 
engaging in text analysis approaches the text with a certain number of preconceptions, e.g. the 
knowledge of a party’s ideological standpoint. Otherwise it would be impossible to interpret 
the text. Although a certain level of preconceptions is necessary for the analysis, it will 
inevitably affect the interpretation (Bergström & Boréus, 2005). As politics in general and 
asylum policy in particular are associated with many preconceptions, I hereby want the reader 
to observe some of mine. First of all I have approached the material with knowledge of 
previous research in mind, and my expectations have been that these patterns will recur in EU 
asylum policy-making. Ideological preconceptions may also lead the researcher in the wrong 
direction. One example of this is the assumption that a socialist party will have a generous 
asylum policy preference as it is built on working class solidarity. In Swedish asylum policy 
this may not be the case (see, e.g. Andersson, 2008; Spång, 2006). The possible influence of 
my preconceptions therefore has been taken into consideration. 
 
To conclude I would like to underline the importance of the analytical framework when it 
comes to unlocking the interpretations made in the empirical analysis. As the parties cannot 
be expected to always be explicit about their preferences, interpretation of their argumentation 
is required. Moreover, by only searching for obvious statements, many of the nuances in the 
political messages will be lost, problems that are addressed by the analytical framework. 
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3.3 Selection of policy cases 
In order to increase the transparency and reliability of the analysis the selection of the 
empirical cases has been based upon three key legislative moments in the creation of the 
CEAS. These moments represents the implementation of a convention, directive or program. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to map out the parties’ preferences on all the policy 
cases that can be linked to the CEAS. By structuring the research around key moments in the 
harmonization process the preferences of the political parties can be captured while at the 
same time making it easier for the reader to follow the analysis. As the cases stretches from 
1998 to 2009 it will be possible to study the preferences over time. The selection of policy 
cases also increases the transparency and the reliability of the study, as they are the 
foundation of the material selection, further explained in the next chapter. The following 
policy cases have been selected: 
 The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens (2010/C 115/01) 
 Council Directive 2001/40/EG on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion 
of third country nationals 
 Convention 1990/06/EC implementing the Schengen agreement 
Why have these three policy cases been selected in particular among the many cases of 
interest for this study? There are currently five legal documents that make up the core of the 
CEAS. It has been governed by three working programs and is affected by a number of other 
directives and regulations. From a research point of view it would be interesting to study all of 
these cases, but unfortunately this is outside of the scope of this thesis. The greatest limitation 
to this study is therefore made on the number of policy cases. In order to build on previous 
research and relate the findings to the general debate on EU migration policy harmonization, 
it is important to include all the parties. For the same reason it is important to investigate party 
preferences on both the supranational/intergovernmental and restrictive/generous dimensions. 
By limiting the study to three policy cases the possibility to make generalizations decreases as 
the preferences are only measured at three time points. Nevertheless it is still possible to make 
a relevant contribution to previous research. I would strongly encourage further research in 
this area and further complement existing data and knowledge by including more time points.  
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As mentioned previously, the three empirical cases represent different phases of the 
harmonization process. The discussions about the Schengen Convention capture party 
preferences before EU asylum policy was formally introduced. “The directive on mutual 
recognition on expulsion decisions” was adopted during the Tampere Program, which is the 
most intense period of asylum policy-making. Finally the Stockholm Programme represents 
the more recent discussions held about asylum policy. These three policy cases have been 
selected for several reasons, both with regards to the legal adaptation pressure and the nature 
of the contents in the policies. One example is the Schengen Convention that had a low 
‘goodness of fit’ with Swedish legislation (Spång, 2006). The need to readjust Swedish 
legislation opened up political debate on if and how this should be done. Policy content is 
another important point. The debate about the mutual recognition of expulsions decisions 
touch upon the core problem of any harmonization process, whether or not to recognize other 
member states legislation, especially since it can be used for both restrictive and generous 
purposes. 
 
The discussions about the Swedish accession to the Schengen area is an excellent starting 
point to investigate the parties’ preferences to the common asylum policy. The debate about 
Schengen membership coincides with Sweden’s accession to the EU in 1995 and is highly 
relevant to our understanding of EU asylum policy. Opening the borders between the member 
states and providing free movement for the EU citizens will naturally have consequences for 
asylum seekers and asylum policy in Sweden. Initially, the Schengen Convention also 
included asylum policy, however it was later incorporated in the Dublin Convention instead 
(Hansen, 2008: 67). Therefore, I argue that although the Schengen area is not part of asylum 
policy as such it can contribute greatly to our understanding of the political parties view on 
the CEAS and is therefore one of the selected policy cases. 
 
“The directive on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country 
nationals” represents the second time point in the analysis. As the title suggests the directive 
aims to encourage the member states to recognize expulsion decisions made by other member 
states. Although the directive covers all migrants, it has a profound effect on asylum seekers, 
which makes it of interest for this study. At this time point the common asylum policy was 
only in its infancy and asylum policies differed greatly among the member states. The 
possibility to recognize other member states legislation, even when the conditions are more 
restrictive, creates a dilemma for traditionally generous countries such as Sweden. The 
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possibility to expel asylum seekers that would have had grounds to stay under Swedish 
legislation could greatly affect the Swedish asylum model. Actors with a restrictive agenda 
may use this opportunity to move towards a more restrictive asylum policy. The parties’ 
position towards this directive provides us with good indications to what extent they are ready 
to defend the traditional Swedish asylum model. 
 
The most recent time point covered is the preparatory discussions on the Stockholm 
Programme. Even though the program covers other areas than migration it sets the direction 
of asylum policy-making in 2010-2014, in essence laying the foundation for the last stages of 
the harmonization process. Furthermore, the Stockholm Programme was prepared and signed 
during the Swedish presidency of 2009 which means Sweden had the opportunity to put its 
own mark on the material. This was not only an opportunity for the government but also 
increased the interest for the Stockholm Program among all the parties. 
 
3.4 Material 
The primary sources of material for this study are official documents originating from the 
Swedish parliament or government. Protocols from debates or committee meetings, 
government bills, and motions put forward by the parties are examples of the types of official 
documentation used.
6
 In the second part of the analysis the official documents are 
complemented with party programs and election manifestos. These types of materials are 
good sources for the motive analysis as they capture the preferences of the political parties at 
a particular time point as well as the argumentation behind them. Mixing motions with 
protocols from debates makes it possible to capture both premeditated messages as well as the 
direct interactions between the parties.  
 
It is of course possible to say one thing and to mean another, and official documents fall short 
when it comes to identifying hidden agendas, preferences the parties have not conveyed in 
public or informal negotiations. The analytical framework makes it possible to identify 
motives behind the outspoken preferences with regards to burden-sharing, venue-shopping 
and international solidarity; however it cannot detect completely hidden agendas. This is not 
the aim of the thesis but could potentially be problematic. 
                                                 
6
 Bills and motions are political propositions put forward in the national legislative process. The bill is put 
forward by the government while the motion is put forward by a single, or a group of, parliamentarian(s). 
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The risk that the material does not capture the actual preferences of the parties is small. The 
material represents different stages of the legislative process, and it is unlikely that a party 
would repeatedly express the complete opposite preference as this could risk the future of 
their actual preference. Hence it is unlikely that a party who repeatedly supports a 
supranational asylum policy would actually prefer it to be intergovernmental. However, there 
are less extreme cases and as asylum policy is a sensitive issue it is possible that a party might 
express a less restrictive preference than they actually desire. This may affect the results in 
cases were parties generally express support for a ‘humane asylum policy’ when they actually 
want to implement further restrictions. Generally speaking this problem should not be of great 
consequence as the analytical framework includes tools to separate preferences and rhetoric. 
In this case, a party would also have state how they want policy to be ‘humane’ in order to be 
classified as generous. 
 
Another important point to make is that an address in a debate by a single parliamentarian 
does not necessarily reflect the position of the whole party, and that that opposing preferences 
within a party may emerge in the debate. In order to avoid this problem the classification of 
the parties has been based upon the full picture given by the different types of materials, e.g. 
protocols from debates, committee meetings and motions, and never on a single address in a 
debate. Nevertheless, the fact that the conflicting positions become public is of course an 
interesting factor in the analysis as it suggests that the issue is causing ‘a stir’ in the party. 
 
The material selection has been based on the three policy cases previously presented. It is not, 
e.g. the Schengen Convention itself that constitute the material but the documents capturing 
the Swedish political debate as a result of it. As all of the documents can be tied to at least one 
of the policy cases the material has not just been randomly selected. This increases the 
reliability of the study as the material captures distinctive time points, which makes it easier 
for the reader to understand on what grounds it has been selected. In addition, the material is 
easily accessible on the Swedish parliament’s webpage.  
 
Quotes will be used in the empirical presentation only to illustrate valuable points from the 
analysis. As the entire material is in Swedish all quotes presented in the text have been 
translated into English by the author. The quotes have been carefully translated; however the 
reader should note that they are translations and not the original quotes. 
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4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Mapping political preferences 
In the first part of the empirical analysis I seek to identify political preferences in relation to 
the three policy cases and to see whether patterns emerge over time. The analysis will be 
conducted on two dimensions; (1) supranational or intergovernmental, and (2) generous or 
restrictive. These concepts have been operationalized into criteria in the analytical frame, 
which makes it possible to capture the nuances of the concepts and the stability of party 
preferences. Although they are presented as a pair of exclusionary concepts the political 
reality is not this rigid. A party is not necessarily generous or restrictive and in reality they 
may be influenced by both. The aim of the analytical frame is, therefore, to uncover which of 
these preferences most characterize the parties. 
 
4.1.1 Supranational and intergovernmental approaches to EU asylum policy 
Supranationality is a concept that is commonly used in research related to the EU, 
unfortunately often without a definition. Although many agree that the EU is a supranational 
institution, opinions tend to differ when it comes to specifying the supranational criteria 
(Andersson, 2008: 30). The focal point of this discussion comes down to the issue of national 
sovereignty and to what extent power has been transmitted from the nation state to another 
institution such as the EU. Forms of decision-making play an important role, and in a 
supranational cooperation the nation states have abandoned their veto power in favor of 
majority voting, which affects the level of state independence (Andersson, 2008: 30-32). In an 
intergovernmental cooperation less power has been allocated to the international institution 
and binding decisions are taken by unanimity (Andersson, 2008: 43-45). Moravscik (1998) 
points out that in intergovernmental cooperation it is the states that drive integration forward, 
not supranational institutions such as the European Commission. These arguments provide the 
foundation for the definition of supranationality in this thesis, especially when it comes to the 
level of state influence.  
 
The first criterion in the analytical frame is whether or not parties openly express support or 
resistance to the common asylum policy. As Hansen (2008) points out the CEAS is a 
supranational project that aims to fully harmonize European asylum polices. Parties that 
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support the CEAS and/or believe it to improve Swedish asylum policy are classified as 
supranational. Likewise, parties that oppose the CEAS and/or view it as a threat to Swedish 
asylum policy are classified as intergovernmental. However, politics is rarely this 
straightforward and in order to capture all the nuances more criteria are required.  
 
In the second criterion the parties’ view of the content of the policy proposal is taken into 
consideration, as progression of the common asylum system generally signifies increased 
supranationality. The primary indicator of this is how the parties position themselves in the 
vote. Parties supporting the policies are seen as having a supranational preference, while 
parties opposing policies are viewed as having an intergovernmental preference. However it is 
not enough to only consider the parties’ vote but also to what extent they support or object to 
it. Is support/opposition given in its entity or is it certain parts of the policy that impacts the 
decision? In the debate on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions the Christian Democrats 
voted against the directive on the grounds that harmonization needed to proceed in other areas 
first, before mutual recognition should be implemented (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, 
quotation 128). However, the party did not disapprove of mutual recognition per se, and 
taking the full picture into consideration the Christian Democrats preference was considered 
supranational. 
 
How the parties use ‘Fortress Europe’ in the debate is the third criterion in the analytical 
frame. As previously mentioned Fortress Europe embodies the idea that the EU is closing the 
union from, e.g. poor migrants (Hansen, 2008; Geddes, 2003). Parties who use Fortress 
Europe to criticize the policies are seen as opponents to the CEAS and are hence classified as 
intergovernmental. Fortress Europe could also have been used to determine generous/ 
restrictive preferences, as intergovernmental and generous preferences often go hand in hand 
in this issue. But as Fortress Europe is used to criticize the common asylum policy as a whole, 
it is used as a measure of intergovernmentalism in this study. Furthermore, as previous studies 
have shown that the small Swedish parties are divided along the supranational/ 
intergovernmental line it is important that a measure of generosity is not also a measure of 
intergovernmentalism. Parties who deny Fortress Europe are considered supranational. One 
example can be found in the Schengen debate were the Social Democrats denied the idea that 
Schengen would create an Orwellian society, as suggested by the Left Party to enhance their 
criticism of Fortress Europe (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 63). 
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The final criterion concerns decision-making procedures. Initially migration policy was an 
intergovernmental policy area but in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty it has 
successively increased in supranationality, including decision-making procedures (Hansen, 
2008: 104-105). The parties approach to this development can contribute to the analytical 
frame. In accordance with Andersson’s (2008) findings Swedish political parties have become 
more positive towards QMV as a way to speed up harmonization of asylum policies. Hence 
parties who support QMV are seen as having a supranational preference while parties 
opposing QMV are seen as having an intergovernmental preference. 
 
4.1.2 Analytical frame: Supranational or intergovernmental preferences 
The following analytical frame summarizes the criteria used to map the preferences of the 
political parties when it comes to the first dimension; if the political parties want asylum 
policy to be supranational or intergovernmental.  
 
Supranational 
 
Intergovernmental 
- The party argues that the CEAS improves 
Swedish refugee policy 
 
- The party argues that the CEAS may 
threaten Swedish refugee policy. 
 
- The party supports the proposed EU 
legislation in the vote. 
 
- The party opposes the proposed EU 
legislation in the vote. 
 
- The party disregards the idea that the CEAS 
strengthens ‘Fortress Europe’ 
 
- The party uses ‘Fortress Europe’ to criticize 
the CEAS 
 
- The party express that decision-making in 
EU asylum policy should be made by QMV 
 
- The party express that decision-making in 
EU asylum policy should be made by 
unanimity 
 
 
4.1.3 Restrictive and generous approaches to EU asylum policy 
Three sets of criteria are used in order to identify restrictive and generous preferences towards 
the common asylum policy. The first criterion concerns the number of refugees the parties 
believe should be allowed to stay. While some advocates larger quotas on the basis on 
solidarity others want to limit the number of refugees due to economic or cultural restraints. 
Although party preferences differ they are rarely specified in numbers (Demker & Malmström 
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1997). Parties who support an open immigration or a large asylum reception are classified as 
generous while parties who want to limit reception to some degree are seen as having a 
restrictive preference. The parties approach to amnesty
7
 is included in this criterion were 
supporters are considered generous. 
 
The second criterion concerns the parties’ approaches to asylum grounds, which is another 
way to impact the number of asylum seekers allowed to stay. War is usually accepted as a 
legitimate grounds for asylum while, e.g. persecution due to homosexuality might be less 
accepted (Demker & Malmström, 1997: 62-63). Hence the particular definition of refugee 
status a party supports contributes to the analytical frame. Parties who support a narrow 
definition of refugee status will be categorized as restrictive while parties supporting a wide 
definition will be categorized as generous.  
 
The third criterion in the analytical frame is the parties approach to minimum conditions. As 
highlighted by Andersson (2008) the support of minimum conditions among the parties 
should be seen as a way to defend the generous Swedish asylum policy. On the basis of 
Andersson’s argumentation and the high level of protection in Swedish asylum policy support 
of minimum conditions should in the Swedish case be considered generous. Parties who 
disapprove are seen as restrictive as it is probable that the level of protection in the CEAS will 
lower standards of Swedish asylum policy. 
 
An important point to make is that the classification of the parties as having a restrictive or 
generous preference is based on a comprehensive assessment including all criteria. Even 
though parties want to come across as being generous towards refugees by making general 
statements such as ‘humane asylum policy’, this is not enough to qualify them as generous. 
They also need to specify how this should be achieved as illustrated by the discussion about 
the Stockholm Programme. In the debate the Social Democrats generally address the need to 
show solidarity with refugees but without examples on how this should be done (EU-nämnden 
2009/10:14, quotation 279). Unlike the Left Party who underlined their generous preference 
by criticizing the contents of the program and its impact on refugee’s rights along with the 
function of the Geneva Convention (Socialförsäkringsutskottet, 2008/09:SfU7y, reservation 
2). Therefore the Social Democrats are not classified as having a generous preference. 
                                                 
7
 When asylum seekers for a limited period of time are granted permanent residence permit 
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4.1.4 Analytical frame: Restrictive or generous preferences 
The following analytical frame summarizes the criteria used to map the preferences of the 
political parties when it comes to the second dimension; if the political parties support a 
generous or restrictive asylum policy. 
 
Restrictive 
 
Generous 
- The party opposes open immigration and/or 
amnesty, and emphasizes the need of 
regulations. 
 
- The party supports open immigration and/or 
the granting of amnesty. 
 
- The party supports a narrow definition of 
refugee status. 
 
- The party supports a wide definition of 
refugee status. 
 
- The party does not support the use of 
minimum conditions in EU asylum policy. 
 
- The party supports the use of minimum 
conditions in EU asylum policy. 
 
 
4.2 Explaining political motives 
As this thesis not only seeks to identify political preferences but also to explain them a 
separate analytical frame is used to support this part of the analysis. The frame for explaining 
the motives of the political parties will draw upon theories on venue-shopping, burden-sharing 
and international solidarity. As explained in the theoretical chapter, burden-sharing and 
venue-shopping have been selected among the many theories on migration policy 
harmonization as they reflect several important elements in the Swedish asylum policy debate. 
As Sweden receives a large share of Europe’s asylum seekers it is plausible that Sweden 
would strive for increased burden-sharing. When it comes to venue-shopping there are quite 
substantial tensions between the political parties in terms of asylum policy, which in 
combination with the high level institutional protection creates incentives to harmonize. 
International solidarity has been selected as it is an important aspect of EU policy-making in 
this area and that has characterized the Swedish national asylum debate. 
 
The contents of the analytical frame build on the theoretical chapter in this thesis. The 
application of the model will reflect both the preferences of the political parties and how they 
have put forward their arguments. For instance, if a party prefers asylum policy to be 
supranational as it levels out the number of asylum seekers among the member states we may 
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assume that burden-sharing plays an important role. The reader should note that this thesis 
does not aim to test whether these theories are applicable in all the member states, rather if 
they can be used to explain the Swedish experience. As noted in the theoretical framework 
many factors impact migration policy, which makes it unlikely that one theoretical 
perspective alone could explain asylum policy harmonization in all the member states. 
Furthermore, as the theories are not exclusionary it is possible that the motives of a political 
party may be explained by, e.g. both venue-shopping and burden-sharing. 
 
4.2.1 Analytical frame: Explaining political motives 
The following analytical frame summarizes the criteria for explaining political motives in 
terms of burden-sharing, venue-shopping and international solidarity as described in the 
theoretical chapter. The theories have been operationalized using the criteria on profile, 
motivations and key words. The profile summarizes the preferences of the parties as well as 
other basic conditions. Motivations summarize the parties’ argumentation and/or other 
motivating factors, while key words pick up the most important points from the theories. The 
analytical model for burden-sharing does not separate one-dimensional and multi-dimensional 
burden-sharing. 
 
 
 
Profile Motivations Key words 
Venue-shopping - Supranational  
- Restrictive 
- Access to Council 
negotiations 
 
- Party faces political 
opposition 
- Need to cement 
own political agenda 
- EU scapegoat 
- Policy pressure 
Burden-sharing - Supranational 
- Restrictive 
- Reception of 
asylum seekers 
should be equalized  
- Efficiency of EU 
policies important 
- Solidarity (MS) 
- Shared 
responsibility 
- Uneven distribution 
- Compensation 
 
International 
solidarity 
- Intergovernmental 
- Generous 
- Maintain 
international 
solidarity 
- Support third world 
countries 
- Multiculturalism 
- Human rights 
- Solidarity (world) 
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5. THE PREFERENCES OF THE SWEDISH POLITICAL PARTIES 
TOWARDS THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM 
5.1 The entering of Sweden into the Schengen area 
Soon after the Swedish accession to the EU in 1995 the question of whether or not Sweden 
should join the Schengen area emerged. At the time Sweden was already a member of the 
Nordic passport union and Schengen participation had to be taken into account by all the 
Nordic countries. In February 1996 the Nordic countries presented a joint statement 
expressing their willingness to join the Schengen area on condition that the Nordic passport 
union would be preserved. Sweden signed the Schengen Convention in December 1996 and in 
the following years the adaptation of the Swedish legislation began (Spång, 2006: 11-12). In 
December 1997 the Social Democratic government put forward a bill (Proposition 
1997/98:42) proposing that the parliament should accept the Swedish membership to the 
Schengen area and implement the convention. The bill was debated in the Swedish parliament 
on 16 April 1998 where it was supported by a majority of the parliamentarians. However, not 
all parties and parliamentarians were equally convinced. The Left Party and the Green Party 
opposed its implementation alongside two members of the Centre Party, one member of the 
Liberal People’s Party and two Social Democrats (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98: 91). 
 
The Left Party was one of the Swedish parties that had the most openly negative view on the 
Swedish accession to the Schengen Area. Their position had been previously stated before the 
accession in the Committee on European Union Affairs, where the party criticized the 
contents of the convention and expressed concerns that it would threaten Swedish asylum 
policy (EU-nämnden 1996/97:13, quotation 125). At the parliamentary debate in 1998 the 
Left Party had a very outspoken intergovernmental approach. Much emphasis was put on the 
restraints created by the convention and how the influence of the Swedish parliament would 
decrease radically. In the debate, Left Party member Alice Åström even drew parallels 
between Schengen and the ‘Orwellian society’ (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 
34). As before the party criticized the contents of the convention as well as those parties who 
supported the idea of free movement. By focusing on the external borders the Left Party 
pointed out that the creation of the Schengen area would lead to the establishment of Fortress 
Europe; 
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We in the Left Party find the increased outer border controls to be absurd. They are not relevant to 
what it [the Schengen Convention] aims to achieve. The free movement, which is being created by the 
Schengen convention today, is a Fortress Europe. It is about shutting people out and achieving an 
enormous amount of control around the outer borders. – Alice Åström (quotation 38) 
 
Studying the Left Party it is also clear that they have a generous asylum policy preference. 
When the bill was being prepared in the Committee on Justice, the Left Party together with 
the Green Party put forward their reservations against the government bill where they 
expressed concerns for the potential negative effects the convention had for asylum seekers 
(Justitieutskottets betänkade 1997/98:JuU15). In the parliamentary debate the Left Party 
supported the motions put forward by the Liberal People’s Party and the Green Party where 
concerns on the convention’s effects on the Swedish asylum policy (Motion 1997/98:Ju17), 
the Geneva Convention and the definition of refugee status (Motion 1997/98:Ju18) were 
raised. 
 
Another party that openly opposed the implementation of the Schengen Convention was the 
Green Party. Prior to the Swedish accession the party expressed concerns about the 
convention’s impact on Swedish asylum policy in the Committee on European Union Affairs 
(EU-nämnden 1996/97:14, quotation 138). In the April debate the Green Party emphasized 
the convention’s negative effects on Swedish influence and sovereignty, and argued that 
Schengen was a typical example of how the EU tries to ‘sneak in’ supranationality. According 
to the Green Party the convention is one of the key steps in creating the ‘EU state’ 
(Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91 quotation 39). Besides the creation of Fortress Europe the 
Green Party referred several times to the deteriorating conditions for asylum seekers and other 
third country nationals. By constructing the outer borders in the Schengen area the EU was 
also securing a restrictive asylum policy; 
 
The reason for the flight is subordinated to the escape route the asylum seekers have taken. There will 
be an iron ring around the EU state were as few people as possible are allowed to come in. Those who 
deviate, have other opinions or in any other way are dangerous for the general order and security 
shall be registered and supervised. - Kia Andreasson (quotation 39) 
 
Prior to the debate the Green Party put forward a motion (1997/98:Ju18) where the 
humanitarian motives of the convention were questioned and concerns for the effects on 
Swedish asylum policy were expressed. The motion emphasized the need for a humanitarian 
asylum system in Europe and that people escaping war and persecution should never be 
hindered by such things as visa requirements. The motion is additional support that the Green 
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Party prefers asylum policy to be intergovernmental and generous. The same argumentation 
was put forward in the Committee on Justice where the party explicitly expressed that 
supranationality would have negative consequences for Sweden and for asylum seekers 
coming to Europe (Justitieutskottets betänkade 1997/98:JuU15). 
 
On the other side in the debate we find the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party 
who both supported the implementation of the Schengen Convention. As government 
representatives and authors of the bill the Social Democratic Party naturally supported its 
contents and opposed the reservations put forward by other parties. In the debate the Social 
Democratic Party emphasized the positive qualities of the free movement, and unlike the Left 
Party and the Green Party they did not see any restraints on the Swedish influence. The Social 
Democrat Göran Magnusson also discarded the comparison made by the Left Party to the 
‘Orwellian society’ (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 63), factors that all support a 
supranational preference. The Social Democratic Party highlighted that asylum policy was no 
longer part of the Schengen Convention and should therefore not be of concern to the debate. 
Furthermore, the party stressed that although asylum seekers have the right to protection they 
do not necessarily have the right to settle in the country of their choice, an indication that the 
party was in no hurry to defend the traditional Swedish asylum policy (Riksdagens protokoll 
1997/98:91, quotation 56).. Their preference should therefore be considered restrictive  
 
The Moderate Party started out in the debate by agreeing with the Social Democrats and the 
contents of the government bill, the first sign that these parties have similar agendas. The 
Moderate Party connected Schengen with an open and borderless society but, unlike the 
government, they believed it to be necessary to introduce further regulations, for instance 
when it comes to the responsibilities of the transporters (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, 
quotation 31). The quest for further regulations suggests that the party prefers more restrictive 
policy measures. Another notable fact is that the Moderate Party associated refugees with 
criminals when discussing the need for increased arrival controls, and pointed to the need for 
more regulations and resources for the police in order for the convention to work properly. 
Equalizing refugees with criminals, and ensuring that asylum seekers who have had their 
application rejected are returned, are both indications that the party prefers restrictive asylum 
policies; 
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The Schengen Convention thereby presupposes an extended arrival control in order to prevent for 
instance unwanted criminals or refugees to uncontrollably cross the Swedish border. – Gun Hellsvik 
(quotation 31) 
 
The Christian Democrats also supported the government bill and the implementation of the 
Schengen Convention in its entirety, and talked about the Schengen area in terms of openness 
and further European integration. Neither did the party see any particular problems regarding 
the Swedish influence on policy-making (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 45). At 
this time the Schengen area was being incorporated into the EU acquis and the fact that the 
Christian Democrats did not foresee any problems with the Swedish influence suggests that 
the party favors supranationality. Regarding generous and restrictive policy preferences the 
Christian Democrats made it quite clear that they prefer asylum policy to be generous, as 
suggested by the following interjection; 
 
We shall make sure that our humane asylum policy is not in any way violated by this community quest. 
– Rolf Åbjörnsson (quotation 45) 
 
Finally, there are two parties were internal differences of opinions becomes quite apparent in 
the debate. In the official party line, the Centre Party supported the government bill and 
welcomed the fact that Sweden would join the Schengen area. Free movement is described in 
positive terms and the party did not see any major problems with regards to the contents of the 
convention (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 32). Interpreting the official party 
line the Centre Party’s position should be considered supranational. In the vote two Centre 
Party members opposed the government bill and also made an interjection in the debate. The 
diverging line within the Centre Party described Schengen in negative terms and highlighted 
that the free movement was not in proportion to the restrictions the convention would impose, 
which for instance would affect asylum seekers. Fears of the development towards an EU 
state were expressed, alongside the fact that Schengen would contribute to the creation of 
Fortress Europe;  
 
No, the EU is building a fortress that will shut the rest of the world out, particularly poor and 
persecuted people who are dreaded to invade our rich region. – Birgitta Hambraeus (quotation 66) 
 
In the interjection references are also made to the time when Swedish politics expressed 
solidarity with third world countries, which suggests that the fractions within the Centre Party 
wants asylum policy to be generous and perceives the current political development as a 
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threat (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 66). It is the official party line that forms 
the empirical results in this study; however it is worth noting that there are conflicting lines 
within the party.   
 
Similar disagreements can be found in the Liberal People’s Party. The official party line 
supported the government bill and the implementation of the Schengen Convention 
(Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 33). The party was quite outspoken in its support 
of European integration, as well as the desire for a supranational and generous asylum policy; 
 
It is an obvious liberal concern to work industriously and forcefully for a humane asylum policy. To 
achieve this goal a common asylum policy within the EU is needed, built on the principle of common 
responsibilities and mutual contributions. – Bengt Harding Olson (quotation 33) 
 
The disagreement that exists within the party did not concern the objective to have a 
supranational and generous asylum policy. Rather the disagreements concerned whether or 
not the Schengen Convention could contribute to this goal. In an address made by Lennart 
Rohdin, member of the Liberal People’s Party, it is quite clear that he also desired a 
supranational and generous asylum policy (Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 72). 
However, according to Rohdin the Schengen Convention cannot contribute to this goal. 
Instead the Schengen area was a way for the European governments to shut the outer borders 
and achieve a more restrictive asylum policy. In his address he criticized the Swedish 
government alongside the Moderate Party and the Centre Party for supporting the restrictive 
development and among other things stated; 
 
The Schengen cooperation does not demand either more open or more closed borders in the EU. It is 
a question of what the governments of Europe want – and they want to use Schengen to make it harder 
to come in. – Lennart Rohdin (quotation 72) 
 
Taking the diverging lines on the Schengen Convention into consideration it becomes clear 
that the Liberal People’s Party supports the development of the CEAS, presuming that it will 
offer generous conditions. 
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Table 1: The positions of the Swedish political parties towards the Schengen 
Convention 
 
 Supranational Intergovernmental 
 
Restrictive 
 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
 
 
Generous 
 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
 
The Left Party 
The Green Party 
 
5.2 Introducing mutual recognition of expulsion decisions 
Migration policy became a formal part of the EU portfolio with the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1999, and the Tampere council meeting became the kickoff for an intense period of 
harmonization within this policy area in 2000-2004. Among the legislation that was produced 
in this period was “The directive on mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third 
country nationals”. The directive was a direct effect of the Schengen cooperation and aims to 
prevent third country nationals who have been denied entry into one member state to hide in 
another member state in the Schengen area (European Union web 2). Prior to its adoption by 
the Council of Ministers in May 2001, the directive was discussed in the Committee on 
European Union Affairs where the majority supported the directive (EU-nämnden 2000/01:9). 
In 2002 a government bill (Proposition 2001/02:182) was presented to the Swedish parliament 
proposing amendments to the national legislation on the basis of the directive. The bill was 
processed in the Committee on Social Insurance, and on the 13 November 2002 the issue of 
mutual recognition on expulsion decisions was debated in the Swedish parliament where it 
was accepted by the Swedish parliament. The Left Party, the Green Party and the Christian 
Democrats opposed the adoption of the bill (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16).   
 
The Christian Democrats was one of three parties that opposed the government bill and had 
prior to the debate submitted a motion against its adoption. In the motion the Christian 
Democrats emphasized that asylum praxis differs greatly among the EU member states and 
that definitions on who is a refugee vary significantly. The Christian Democrats therefore 
believed that Sweden should wait to implement the directive until the harmonization process 
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had progressed further (Motion 2001/02:Sf38). These arguments were also put forward in the 
debate (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16) where the Christian Democrat Sven Brus pointed 
out the huge differences in European asylum systems and that the implementation of this 
directive should wait until a higher level of protection for refugees could be guaranteed 
throughout Europe;  
 
We believe that the level of protection needs to reach a higher minimum level. The Geneva Convention 
and European Convention on Human Rights must be applied at a high minimum level in all the EU 
states. – Sven Brus (quotation 128) 
 
Studying the argumentation made by the Christian Democrats it is apparent that the party 
wants a generous asylum policy. At the same time it is clear that the party believes that this 
could be achieved by the CEAS. Even though they opposed the implementation of the 
directive at this particular time point, they did not discard the idea of a harmonized asylum 
policy, support of a supranational preference (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 
128). 
 
The Left Party also voted against the government bill and made several critical remarks 
against the directive and the government bill. The Left Party submitted a motion similar to the 
Christian Democrats’ but in a much more critical tone. Implementing mutual recognition on 
expulsion decisions before having achieved a high level of protection for refugees and other 
immigrants was impossible. Unlike the Christian Democrats, the Left Party viewed this 
development as a way for the EU and the European governments to conciliate the right-wing 
extremist forces in Europe and deemed it another step on the way to create more restrictions 
for asylum seekers (Motion 2001/02:Sf37). This argument was repeated in the debate 
alongside sharp remarks about the creation of Fortress Europe. Moreover the party feared that 
the future application of the directive would be restrictive and pointed out that asylum policy 
should not be supranational (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 129). Further 
support of the Left Party’s intergovernmental and generous preference can be found in the 
following statement from the debate; 
 
What is more uncertain is why Sweden falls back and instead does not stand up for legal security and 
argues for a more humanitarian politics. Kalle Larsson (quotation 129) 
 
The Green Party’s negative approach to the directive could be seen already prior to its 
adoption by the Council of Ministers, in the Committee on European Union Affairs (EU-
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nämnden 2000/01:9, quotation 188). In the November debate the Green Party agreed with the 
Left Party and Christian Democrats on many points. The Schengen Convention made it very 
difficult to cross the EU’s outer border legally, and directives such as this restrict the 
possibilities for refugees and other immigrants to enter the EU legally. The fact that all 
member states do not apply equal conditions when judging asylum applications was 
considered a problem, and as no requirements on equal judgments have been made the Green 
Party could not accept the implementation of the directive. Furthermore the application of the 
directive was at risk of being arbitrary and could possibly have been used to reject immigrants 
on grounds other than what is stated in the directive (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, 
quotation 130). Although the Green Party did not express themselves quite as vividly as in the 
Schengen debate their position should be considered intergovernmental and generous. 
Concerns about the standards in other member states and arbitrary applications indicate that 
the party wants to protect generous conditions for refugees. The fact that the party opposed 
the directive points to an intergovernmental approach (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, 
quotation 130). 
 
The Liberal People’s Party supported the government bill and the implementation of mutual 
recognition of expulsion decisions. The party acknowledged that the legislative process might 
have started at the wrong end and that minimum conditions on issues such as refugee status 
should have been in place first, but this were not considered it a major problem since the 
directive did not require mutual recognition to take place. The party’s support of the directive 
should be viewed as a continuation of the supranational preference also observed in the 
Schengen debate (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 141). Even though the Liberal 
People’s Party supported the directive they still took the opportunity to express concerns 
about the development of more restrictive asylum policies throughout Europe and criticized 
the government for not defending the traditional Swedish generous asylum policy; 
 
I feel a deep concern over a Europe – not primarily the EU in this case – and European countries that 
successively closes their borders. Unlike Anita Jönsson from the Social Democrats, who speaks about 
the strong Swedish asylum policy, I am ashamed of a Sweden that time after time during recent years 
has tightened its asylum policy. – Erik Ullenhag (quotation 141) 
 
Support of the directive and the government bill was also given by the Centre Party, who did 
not see any general problems with the directive and pointed out that many of the concerns 
highlighted by some of the other parties were accounted for in the directive. In the debate they 
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expressed support for both the directive and the CEAS which indicates that the Centre Party 
still favors supranationality. Another sign of this is the fact that they did not problematize the 
contents of the directive. At the same the Centre Party stressed that they want the common 
asylum system to be generous and made references to both solidarity and minimum 
conditions; 
 
The asylum policy must be built upon refugees’ rights, international solidarity and complete respect of 
international commitments. The common asylum policy should be made up by minimum conditions at 
the highest possible level. – Birgitta Carlsson (quotation 146) 
 
The agreement between the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party observed in the 
Schengen debate can also be seen at this time. The Social Democratic Party was in 
government at the time and had participated in the adoption of the directive in the Council of 
Ministers. The party was also the authors of the government bill and naturally supported its 
contents. The Social Democrats emphasized that the application of the directive was not 
mandatory and that it was an important cornerstone in the creation of the free movement. 
Based on their support and uncritical approach to the directive their preference should be 
considered supranational (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 131). In the debate the 
Social Democrats also made general comments about the importance of solidarity and legal 
justice in asylum policy. But as they did not make any particular remarks on how this should 
be achieved, for instance by improving reception conditions, their preference cannot be 
considered generous. Compared with, e.g. the Centre Party who argued in favor of minimum 
conditions, the Social Democratic Party is not at the same level. 
 
As in the Schengen debate, the Moderate Party supported the government bill and the 
incorporation of the directive into the Swedish legislation. The party stressed that the free 
movement is a cornerstone in the European cooperation and viewed the directive as necessary 
to support the free movement. Support for the directive, alongside support of the common 
asylum policy, indicates that the party still preferred asylum policy to be supranational. 
Previously in the debate the question of legal security and the practical application of the 
directive, as well as the contribution to Fortress Europe had been questioned by the Left Party 
and the Green Party. This perspective was not brought up or countered by the Moderate Party 
at all. At one time they made a quite vague statement that the Swedish approach hopefully 
would affect other member states, but otherwise they did not make any statements that could 
be interpreted as either outspokenly generous or restrictive. The fact that they did not counter 
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the criticism put forward by the Left Party and the Green Party suggests that they had no 
interest in defending a generous standpoint (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 136). 
 
Table 2: The positions of the Swedish political parties towards the directive on 
mutual recognition on expulsion decisions 
 Supranational Intergovernmental 
 
Restrictive 
 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
 
 
Generous 
 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
 
The Left Party 
The Green Party 
 
5.3 Preparing the Stockholm Programme 
During the Swedish presidency in the EU in 2009 the new multi-annual strategic work 
program for the area of justice, freedom and security were in its final stage of negotiations. 
The work program would be signed during the Swedish presidency and was hence named the 
Stockholm Programme. The completion of the CEAS was an important subject in the 
Stockholm Programme, as the new deadline had been set for the end of 2012, which meant 
that it has the potential to make a substantial imprint on the common asylum policy (European 
Union web 3). In preparation of the final discussions on the Swedish official standpoint, the 
government
8
 put forward a memorandum just before the Swedish presidency started 
(2008/09:FPM137) generally supporting the Stockholm Programme. As it spans several 
policy areas it was processed by several committees. The sections concerning immigration 
and asylum policy was processed by the Committee on Social Insurance where the majority 
supported the government’s positive standpoint. The Social Democratic Party, the Left Party 
and the Green Party put forward reservations (Socialförsäkringsutskottet, 2008/09:SfU7y). 
 
The Green Party had a quite negative approach to the Stockholm Programme, not at least in 
terms of asylum policy. In the Committee on Social Insurance the party stressed that the EU 
should not regulate migration policy areas since it limits the possibilities of individual 
migrants, especially asylum seekers, to enter the EU legally. Instead, it should be up to each 
                                                 
8
 Since the election in 2006 Sweden has been governed by a coalition consisting of the Moderate Party, the 
Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the Christian Democrats.  
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member state to regulate immigration and asylum policy (Socialförsäkringsutskottet, 
2008/09:SfU7y). With regards to the Stockholm Programme the Green Party also put forward 
a motion (Motion 2009/10:Ju384) where they criticized its contents, especially concerning 
asylum policy. In the motion, the party wrote that the EU should not have an asylum policy of 
its own and the attempts to create one were just a way to keep immigrants out. These types of 
statements are indications that the party still advocates an intergovernmental and generous 
asylum policy; 
 
The EU’s current asylum policy is beneath contempt. The EU is building higher walls against the 
outside world and practice a wild pursue of “illegal” immigrants. […] The plan is to have a fully 
harmonized asylum policy with absolute restrictiveness and increased militarization at the outer 
borders. (Motion 2009/10:Ju384, chapter 3) 
 
The Left Party also used the Stockholm Programme to criticize the common asylum policy. In 
the Committee on Social Insurance the Left Party highlighted the negative impact of the 
Stockholm Program on asylum seeker. The party argued that harmonization of asylum policy 
has led to substantially worse conditions for asylum seekers coming to Europe, and that a 
common asylum policy would inevitably lead to conditions that are at the minimum level in 
terms of legal justice and treatment of asylum seekers. Therefore, the party did not see any 
benefits with the CEAS and preferred asylum policy to be intergovernmental 
(Socialförsäkringsutskottet, 2008/09:SfU7y, reservation 2). In relation to this argumentation 
the Left Party made the following statement; 
 
Unfortunately we can establish that the misgivings put forward have come true. A number of the 
adopted [asylum] directives have in different ways been designed so that the asylum right has been put 
out of play and the Geneva Convention made useless. (2008/09:SfU7y, reservation 2) 
 
The Social Democratic Party also had reservations against the government’s position that 
were expressed in the Committee on Social Insurance. In the reservation the Social Democrats 
emphasized that they supported a common asylum policy in Europe but that it is important 
that it builds upon humanitarian values and legal security (Socialförsäkringsutskottet, 
2008/09:SfU7y, reservation 1). This opinion was also repeated in the Committee on European 
Union Affairs (2009/10:14, quotation 279). The fact that Social Democrats highlight the 
importance of humanity on two occasions might be an indication that the party’s preference is 
turning generous. On the other hand, the generosity in the Social Democratic rhetoric is only 
expressed at a general level, with no mentioning of specific policy requirements such as 
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reception conditions or refugee status. Even though the rhetoric has become softer it is not 
enough to classify their position as generous. 
 
At the time of the Stockholm Programme the Swedish government was made up by an 
alliance between the Moderate Party, the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the 
Christian Democrats. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the Swedish official 
standpoint towards the Stockholm program was positive. When the government’s position 
was presented in the Committee on Social Insurance, the government also expressed support 
for the continued process of completing the CEAS; 
 
Sweden aims at a deepened cooperation within the asylum policy area and sees the establishment of a 
common European asylum system as an important overall objective within the EU’s asylum policy. 
(2009/10:2330BE) 
 
Considering the fact that all of the government parties supported this statement their 
preferences should be considered supranational. When it comes to whether or not asylum 
policy should be generous or restrictive the government parties’ preferences have diverged in 
the past. The question is to what extent the parties have been willing to compromise as part of 
the Swedish government? 
 
The Moderate Party is the largest party in the government coalition and holds both the 
premiership and the post as Minister of Migration and Asylum Policy. The party also 
defended asylum policy harmonization outside of government statements (EU-nämnden 
2009/10:16, quotation 6) and although the party referred more often than previously to the 
need for solidarity they, like the Social Democrats, did not make any concrete suggestions on 
how it should be improved. When Moderate minister Tobias Billström was questioned about 
the human rights perspective of asylum seeking in the Stockholm Programme, he played 
down the problem and pointed out that the current regulations in the Stockholm Programme 
are enough to protect the rights of asylum seekers (Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:40, 
quotation 19). Another indication of their restrictive preference is the disregard of the value of 
minimum conditions in the CEAS (Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:48, quotation 88). 
 
The Centre Party‘s supranational preference can also be seen in the committee meetings, for 
instance in the Committee on European Union Affairs were they highlighted that the 
continuous harmonization of asylum policy is good. It is also noticeable that the Centre Party 
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has a more toned down approach when it comes to the level of generosity in asylum policy, 
especially in comparison with the debate on mutual recognition on expulsion decisions. The 
party did not believe that the Stockholm Programme would have a negative impact on asylum 
seekers (EU-nämnden 2009/10:14, quotation 208). Even though they mentioned the fact that 
harmonization should not result in lower standards, the overall impression suggests that the 
Centre Party has shifted their preference towards restrictiveness.  
 
The same patterns can be seen among the Christian Democrats. The party has held on to their 
supranational preference, but unlike the previous debates their generous approach is more 
toned down. The Christian Democrats were almost invisible in the debate about the 
Stockholm Programme, an observation that could also be leveled at the other two small 
government parties. The Christian Democrats have in previous debates expressed the need for 
a humanitarian and generous asylum policy, but in this debate no such statements were made.  
 
Finally, the Liberal People’s Party also seems to have become more restrictive as they entered 
into the government coalition. Generally speaking, they still addressed the need for a humane 
asylum policy, but at the same time made statements about the fact that laws are made to be 
followed, and that not all immigrants have the possibility to stay in Sweden (Riksdagens 
protokoll 2009/10:48, quotation 49).  
 
Table 3: The positions of the Swedish political parties towards the Stockholm 
Programme 
 
 Supranational Intergovernmental 
 
Restrictive 
 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
 
 
 
Generous 
 
 
 
The Left Party 
The Green Party 
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5.4 Summary of party preferences 
Generally speaking the parties’ preferences are fairly stable over time. Moving from the time 
of the Schengen Convention to the discussions on “The directive on mutual recognition of 
expulsion decisions” party preferences are unchanged on both dimensions. However, at the 
time of the Stockholm Programme party preferences seem to have shifted, were the Centre 
Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal People’s Party display increasingly restrictive 
preferences. This may be a result of their participation in the government coalition, as the 
Moderate Party has shown stable restrictive preferences. However, in order to confirm that 
this change in preference is permanent, more studies are needed on other policy cases from 
period in order to confirm the shift in preferences and to and anchor our knowledge about the 
party preferences. 
 
Table 4: Summary of party preferences 
 
Supranational & Restrictive 
 
Supranational & Generous 
 
Intergovernmental & 
Generous 
 
The Schengen Convention 
 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
The Left Party 
The Green Party 
 
The directive on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions 
 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
The Left Party 
The Green Party 
 
The Stockholm Programme 
 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
 The Left Party 
The Green Party 
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6. EXPLAINING THE MOTIVES OF THE SWEDISH POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
As seen in the first part of the empirical analysis the Swedish political parties can be sorted 
into different groups when it comes to harmonization of asylum policy in the European 
Union. Differences in preferences suggest that the parties are driven by different motives. In 
this part of the empirical analysis I seek to investigate whether or not these motives can be 
explained by burden-sharing, venue-shopping and/or international solidarity. 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party are often 
in agreement when it comes to EU asylum policy and share a supranational and restrictive 
preference. One of the theories that can be applied to these parties is burden-sharing. The fact 
that both the Social Democrats and the Moderates are motivated by burden-sharing can be 
seen in relation to all three policy cases. The Moderate Party highlighted the need for 
efficiency in the Schengen debate and later pointed out that the Stockholm Programme would 
increase solidarity and shared responsibility in the CEAS (EU-nämnden 2009/10:16, 
quotation 2). The Moderate Party’s ambition that the common asylum policy would increase 
shared responsibility in Europe could also be seen in the party’s European Parliament election 
manifesto from 2009; 
 
It is important that all countries in the union take responsibility for Europe’s influx of refugees. A 
common policy in the area makes it possible to welcome more people to Europe as a whole.  
(Moderaterna, 2009: 10). 
 
Similar arguments can be found in the Social Democratic Party who on several occasions has 
supported their supranational preference with arguments of burden-sharing. One example of 
this can be seen in the discussions about the Stockholm Programme were the party 
highlighted the gains that can be made by equalizing reception of asylum seekers in Europe 
(Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:48, quotation 72). The fact the member states must share 
responsibilities when it comes to asylum policy was also expressed in the Social Democrats’ 
party program (Socialdemokraterna, 2001: 34). 
 
Evidence of venue-shopping can also be found in relation to the Social Democratic Party and 
the Moderate Party. As laid down in the previous chapter several of the prerequisites for 
venue-shopping can be linked to these parties. They both support a supranational and 
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restrictive asylum policy and have both been in government during the studied time period. 
Previous research and the empirical results have shown that these parties occasionally face 
substantial political opposition from the smaller parties. As seen in the debate about mutual 
recognition of expulsion decisions, criticism against the government was put forward for not 
defending the generous Swedish asylum policy (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16). In 
combination with the findings made by Spehar (2012) that the small parties have hindered the 
Social Democrats and the Moderates to implement restrictive policy proposals in Swedish 
asylum policy, incentives to venue-shop are present. In contrast to the smaller parties the 
Social Democrats and Moderates show little criticism of the proposed EU policy and have 
been very supportive of the supranational policy proposals in all the three cases. 
 
When studying the small parties in the government coalition, i.e. the Liberal People’s Party, 
the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats, venue-shopping is not applicable. As shown in 
the previous chapter they have generally supported a supranational and generous asylum 
policy, even though they seem to have become more restrictive after entering a government 
coalition with the Moderate Party. As the following sections will show, their preferences can 
instead be explained by burden-sharing and international solidarity. 
 
The supranational preference of the Liberal People’s Party can be explained by burden-
sharing. Besides their continuous support of the supranational asylum policy the party often 
rests upon arguments of burden-sharing. In the debate on the Stockholm Programme the party 
stated that increased solidarity between the member states is an important part of the CEAS 
and underlined the need to economically reimburse countries who take on a greater 
responsibility of asylum reception (Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:48, quotation 49). As seen 
in the previous chapter, statements such as ‘shared responsibilities’ and ‘mutual contributions’ 
were used already in the Schengen debate (Riksdagens protokoll 1998/98:91, quotation 31). 
This picture is confirmed when studying the party’s political program from 2007; 
 
A common asylum policy should be developed within the frame of the EU so that the responsibility for 
the influx of refugees will be more evenly distributed. (Folkpartiet liberalerna, 2007: 42) 
 
Although the preference of the Liberal People’s Party seems to have become more restrictive 
in recent years the party has previously expressed an outspokenly generous preference when it 
comes to the common asylum policy. This suggests that the party, at least initially, was 
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motivated by the urge to achieve greater international solidarity. This is not only supported by 
the policy cases but also by the party’s European Parliament election manifesto that addresses 
problems with reception conditions and legal security (Folkpartiet liberalerna, 2009: 7). 
 
International solidarity is also a motive for the Centre Party, at least prior to the Stockholm 
Programme. The importance to show solidarity with the rest of the world is expressed on 
several occasions and the need to create an asylum policy that is built upon the rights of the 
refugees was for instance expressed in the debate about mutual recognition of expulsion 
decisions (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 146). The same argumentation can be 
found in the European Parliament election manifesto from 2009, were the party to some 
extent used international solidarity to motivate their asylum policy preferences (Centerpartiet, 
2009: 5). 
 
Burden-sharing can be found as one underlying factor when explaining the Christian 
Democrats’ desire to have a supranational asylum policy. In the party program from 2001 the 
party states that a common asylum policy is preferable as it not only increases international 
solidarity but also the shared responsibility between the member states (Kristdemokraterna, 
2001: 19). In the previous chapter, the Christian Democrats generous standpoint was 
established, which supports the idea that international solidarity is another of the party’s 
motives. This picture is confirmed when studying the Christian Democrats European 
Parliament election manifesto from 2009; 
 
The EU is one of the richest regions in the world and has a great responsibility to receive people who 
are forced to flee persecution and oppression. (Kristdemokraterna, 2009: 5) 
 
However, it is important to point out that the Christian Democrats occasionally distance 
themselves from the Green Party and the Left Party when it comes to international solidarity 
(see, e.g. Riksdagens protokoll 1997/98:91, quotation 45), which may indicate that although 
they share the same goal that have different opinions on how it should be achieved. 
 
When studying the Green Party and the Left Party no support of either burden-sharing or 
venue-shopping can be found. The parties are not interested in a supranational asylum policy, 
and have continuously stressed that this would lead to worsened conditions for asylum seekers 
all over Europe. With regards to burden-sharing their support of increasing admittance of 
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refugees in Sweden and extending the reception conditions contradict the fact that they would 
want to pass over some of Sweden’s responsibility to other member states. Another example 
can be found in the discussions about the Stockholm Program were both parties expressed the 
need to introduce amnesty (Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:48, quotation 65, 68). As the parties 
have not been in government and both have a generous asylum policy preference their 
motives cannot be explained by venue-shopping. Possibly the parties have indirectly 
contributed to venue-shopping as they have been very outspoken in their resistance to the 
CEAS, which may have led other parties to venue-shop. One indication of this is found in the 
Left Party’s European Parliament election manifesto from 2009 where the party severely 
criticized the Swedish line in European asylum policy-making; 
 
The walls of Fortress Europe are getting higher. […] The government and parliament must not hide 
behind the EU in asylum politics. Moral courage is needed by Swedish politicians to stop this 
development. (Vänsterpartiet, 2009: 9) 
 
However, what is clear when studying the three policy cases is that the Green Party and the 
Left Party are driven by international solidarity, as they have continuously emphasized the 
need to show solidarity with refugees and third world countries. In the discussions about 
mutual recognition on expulsion decisions the Left Party member Kalle Larsson pointed out 
that the common asylum policy would inevitably lead to restrictions and made it clear that this 
development was not desirable (Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:16, quotation 129). The Green 
Party highlighted in the European Parliament election manifesto from 2009 that their politics 
is based on global justice and that asylum policy must be humane (Miljöpartiet, 2009: 3). The 
same tendencies can be found in the Left Party who, in their European Parliament election 
manifesto, pointed out that they work for a humane asylum reception, which is seriously 
threatened by the supranational asylum policy (Vänsterpartiet, 2009: 9, 14).  
 
Table 5: Burden-sharing, venue-shopping or international solidarity? Summary 
of party motives 
Burden-sharing Venue-shopping International solidarity 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Christian Democrats 
The Moderate Party 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Left Party 
The Green Party 
The Liberal People’s Party 
The Centre Party 
The Christian Democrats 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
After examining the political parties’ preferences in relation to the Schengen Convention, 
“The directive on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions” and the Stockholm Programme 
it is clear that many of the conclusions reached in previous research can be confirmed. The 
map out of the political parties’ preferences supports the idea that they can be divided into 
blocks, as suggested by Spång (2006), that does not follow the usual left-right divide. The 
Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party are often in agreement and advocate a more 
restrictive policy, unlike the small parties who generally agree that asylum policy should be 
generous. The Swedish positive official standpoint to a supranational asylum policy is 
supported by the majority of the parties and in accordance with the empirical results the 
parties can be divided into three groups; (1) supranational and restrictive, (2) supranational 
and generous and (3) intergovernmental and generous. There are patterns in party preferences 
that are stable until the time of the Stockholm Programme, when the small centre-right parties 
display changes. The analysis has also shown that theories on European migration 
harmonization can be useful in explaining the formation of the Swedish standpoint to the 
common asylum system, but that they fit the different parties to a varying degree.  
 
The Moderates and Social Democrats agreement on asylum policy may seem strange at first, 
but taking into account the dimensions presented by Zolberg (1999) and the fact that they are 
the two dominating political parties in Sweden the picture becomes clearer. When comparing 
the Social Democrats with the Left Party one might expect that they would hold similar 
positions as they both have roots in socialism. The Social Democrats intimate relationship 
with the trade union movement is vital to understanding this difference. As Zolberg points 
out, trade unions fear that immigration will have a negative impact on working conditions and 
wage levels. This could be the reason why the Social Democrats, unlike the Left Party, 
support restrictions.  
 
The dominating position of the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party in Swedish 
politics is another factor that may explain their agreement on asylum policy. These two parties 
take turn to hold the prime ministry which is likely to affect their politics. The supranational 
and restrictive line may be a way for the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party to 
show that they take responsibility for Swedish asylum policy. The smaller parties, who 
disagree whether or not asylum policy should be supranational, all prefer a generous asylum 
49 
 
policy. The result may seem puzzling considering the different ideological backgrounds of 
these parties. Again the ideas of Zolberg (1999) are useful, especially regarding the role of 
multiculturalism and helping people in distress, a form of argumentation that all these parties 
use in the debate. 
 
This study may also contribute partly to the lack of empirical evidence on the stability of 
party preferences, a problem that has previously been pointed out by Andersson (2008). In the 
beginning of the harmonization process the party preferences are stable, but as the change of 
government occurred in 2006 the preferences of the small centre-right parties start to shift. At 
the time of the Stockholm Programme the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the 
Christian Democrats display more restrictive preferences than previously. As they are now 
taking part in the government coalition, it is likely that they have had to adapt their politics to 
better fit the collaboration. As the parties were in opposition during the other two time points 
it was easier for them to express deviating or more extreme opinions. Further evidence that 
the parties have had to adapt is found in their European Parliament election manifestos from 
2009, were they generally express more generous preferences than in the policy discussions. 
Since this study only includes one policy case after 2006 it is not possible to confirm that this 
shift is permanent, or if in fact the new restrictive approach can only be tied to this policy 
case. More studies are needed including other policy cases after 2006. An interesting angle in 
this research would be to investigate if the small government parties have tried to affect the 
Moderate Party’s restrictive preference, as they have previously shown themselves capable of 
opposing restrictive government proposals. 
 
As pointed out in the beginning of this chapter this thesis has also found empirical support for 
the applicability of burden-sharing, venue-shopping and international solidarity, however they 
can be applied to the political parties to different extents. The Moderate Party and the Social 
Democratic Party are both driven by burden-sharing and venue-shopping, while there is no 
evidence to suggest that these theories are applicable for the Green Party and the Left Party. 
There is evidence that all of the small parties are motivated by international solidarity, while 
the centre-right parties show simultaneous support of burden-sharing. Considering the Social 
Democrats’ and Moderates’ restrictive and supranational preference and the fact that they 
dominate Swedish politics their support of burden-sharing is not odd. As Sweden receives a 
great proportion of Europe’s asylum seekers, and that these parties often are ultimately 
responsible for the function of Swedish asylum policy, their desire to have other member 
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states taking responsibility is logic from a cost and efficiency perspective. The fact that 
burden-sharing also can explain the supranational preference of the Liberal People’s Party and 
the Christian Democrats is further support that the ideas of Thielemann (2008) have empirical 
relevance, at least in Sweden. In order to properly evaluate the relevance of burden-sharing in 
European asylum policy harmonization, it needs to be applied to more cases in other member 
states.  
 
The empirical results also support the idea that the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate 
Party are motivated by venue-shopping. This is not strange considering that both parties have 
been in government during this time period, they have had access to negotiations at the EU 
level and unlike the small parties displayed restrictive preferences. The empirical analysis has 
shown that the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party are often opposed by the 
small parties. Moreover, Spehar (2012) has previously pointed out that the small parties on 
several occasions have hindered restrictive asylum policy proposals put forward by the Social 
Democrats and the Moderates. By venue-shopping it is possible for the Social Democratic 
Party and the Moderate Party to cement their policy preferences at the EU level, while 
shifting blame to the EU. As with burden-sharing this thesis can only confirm the applicability 
of venue-shopping on the Swedish political parties. Still, small steps towards confirming the 
ideas of Guiraudon (2001, 2003) and Givens and Luedkte (2004) have been made. 
 
Among the small parties international solidarity is an important motive, even though there is a 
divide between supranational and intergovernmental preferences. The Green Party and the 
Left Party have a distinct focus on international solidarity, which will not be achieved by 
supranationality. Party ideology is one factor that may help to understand their motives. 
Solidarity is an important part of the ideology of both parties, such as the Green Party’s idea 
about ‘global solidarity’. The Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the Christian 
Democrats are also motivated by the idea of international solidarity, but believe that this can 
be achieved by supranationality. Here it is likely that the parties’ general approach to the EU 
has a role to play. The centre-right parties are EU supporters while the Green Party and the 
Left Party have been outspoken EU opponents. As this analysis does not measure to what 
extent each theory fits the political parties, and that the results show mixed preferences, there 
are reasons to believe that other factors play a role. Clearly, the motive behind the Left Party’s 
generous and intergovernmental preference can be explained by more factors than 
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international solidarity. In order to get a fuller picture on how the political parties think and 
act when it comes to EU asylum policy, further studies need to be conducted.  
 
The aim of this thesis has not been to find support of the applicability for these three theories 
throughout the EU, and to this end I want to stress that the empirical results of this study are 
only applicable for Sweden. Moreover, even though empirical evidence has been found in 
support of these theories this study cannot confirm to what degree they affect each party. 
Even though the Social Democratic Party is motivated by both burden-sharing and venue-
shopping, there is no way of singling out which one of these theories, if any, is the most 
influential. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that by combining the 
study of the political interplay at the national level with overarching theories on migration 
policy harmonization we get a much better understanding of how the Swedish standpoint to 
the CEAS has been formulated. Without studying how the mainstream parties interact and 
argue, we would have a limited understanding of how and why the Swedish standpoint looks 
the way it does. And without the overarching theories on migration policy harmonization the 
motives of the political parties would have been much harder to unfold and tie to European 
integration.  
 
All in all, the study of the political parties in relation to asylum policy harmonization in the 
EU has not only increased our knowledge on Swedish asylum policy-making, but also how 
overarching theories such as burden-sharing can be empirically applied. However, this thesis 
only represents three cases in the harmonization process and in order to confirm the findings 
and get a more detailed picture of how the Swedish parties think and act when it comes to the 
CEAS more studies are needed. I hope that with this study I have shown how important it is to 
review the political parties in order to get a full understanding of why the European countries 
have chosen to harmonize asylum policy. These types of studies are of course not only 
applicable in Sweden, and by extending the research to other member states our 
understanding of the European migration policy harmonization could be much more 
extensive. 
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